

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

HR



# National Intelligence Bulletin

DIA review(s) completed.

State Dept. review completed

**Top Secret**

January 14, 1976

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

No. 669

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

### CONTENTS

	25X1
LEBANON: Situation report . . . . .	2
	25X1
USSR-US: Growing concern in Moscow about effect of Angola on follow-on SALT accord . . . . .	7
	25X1
ITALY: Moro designated formateur . . . . .	9
NORWAY: New policy on attacking unidentified submarines . . . . .	10
PORTUGAL-CUBA: Azores as refueling stop . . . . .	11
	25X1
SPANISH SAHARA: Spanish military withdrawal complete . . . . .	13
	25X1
USSR-JAPAN: Effect of Gromyko's visit to Japan . . . . .	16
	25X6
	25X1
ETHIOPIA: Violence in the provinces . . . . .	21
FOR THE RECORD . . . . .	23

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

**National Intelligence Bulletin**

January 14, 1976

**LEBANON**

Christian militiamen appear to have gained the advantage over Palestinian forces fighting to break the Christian blockade of Tall Zatar refugee camp. Phalanges forces reportedly have been able to hold a stationary line encircling the camp, despite heavy fire from adjacent Muslim areas and a nearby Palestinian camp.

The Christians say they will not lift the blockade of Tall Zatar and other camps until the camps are disarmed and brought under control of the Lebanese army. The Palestinians have countered with threats to blockade Christian communities in predominantly Muslim areas of Beirut. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Clashes continued in virtually all areas of Beirut, and most roads leading into the capital have been cut as the fighting has spread to surrounding villages. The fighting has also intensified in Zahlah and the Tripoli-Zagharta area, where the army has failed in its attempts to separate warring Christian and Muslim militiamen.

President Franjiyah met with leaders of the major Christian groups yesterday, presumably to work out a coordinated position before he meets with Syrian President Asad. The two leaders are now expected to meet on Saturday. Franjiyah is almost certainly intending to use Christian military successes as his major bargaining point in negotiations with the Syrians.

Apparently in reaction to an appeal from Yasir Arafat for Arab action to relieve the Palestinians' siege, Egypt yesterday called for an Arab League initiative to put an end to the "intolerable" Christian blockade.

President Sadat, declaring Egypt's concern to preserve the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, later denounced the recent turn of events there and added an additional injunction against Israeli intervention. Without elaborating, he said that Egypt would "assume its responsibilities" if Israel intervened. He reiterated his position yesterday that Arab or other foreign intervention is not the way to resolve the crisis.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

### USSR-US

A prominent Soviet academician, V. V. Zhurkin, who closely follows Moscow's relations with Washington, says there is growing concern in the USSR that Soviet actions in Angola could prejudice chances for a SALT II agreement.

25X1

[redacted] one of the few signs to date that at least some influential Soviets have begun to give serious consideration to US warnings about the potential ramifications of the Angolan affair. Zhurkin, a deputy director of the USA Institute, almost certainly is sensitive to the impact of such a situation as Angola on the US-Soviet relationship.

Zhurkin nevertheless defended Soviet assistance to the Popular Movement and reiterated Moscow's standard position that the USSR would not for the sake of detente sacrifice its long-standing policy of support to national liberation movements. He expressed confidence that detente would continue, despite periodic irritants and inevitable debates over detente within Western countries. Drawing an analogy to the recent controversy over Soviet activity in Portugal, Zhurkin offered the opinion that Western criticism of Soviet support for the Popular Movement would eventually subside.

He acknowledged, however, that Western public opinion entailed an element of risk for Soviet policy, especially if that opinion jeopardized chances for US Congressional ratification of a new SALT agreement. Progress toward strategic arms limitation remains the linchpin of improved US-Soviet relations, he said, both because of its intrinsic importance and because of the impetus a new agreement would give to other negotiations, such as the MBFR talks.

25X1

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1



---

## National Intelligence Bulletin

---

January 14, 1976

### ITALY

Italian Prime Minister Moro was asked by President Leone yesterday to try to form another government.

Moro's Christian Democrats have reportedly instructed him to attempt to get all four parties of the center-left—Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans—to return to full participation in the government.

Following the collapse in late 1974 of the last coalition in which all four participated, only two of these parties—the Christian Democrats and Republicans—had positions in the cabinet headed by Moro that fell last week. The Socialists and Social Democrats limited their role to parliamentary support for his government.

Since differences among the parties have deepened in the past year, Moro will have major hurdles to clear before he can revive the alliance. The Socialists maintain that the growing strength of the left entitles them to treatment as a political equal by the dominant party.


Although the Socialist representation in parliament does not approach that of the Christian Democrats, the Socialists are actually in a pivotal position. Their votes alone are sufficient to give the Christian Democrats the majority they need to continue governing without the Communists. A Christian Democratic attempt to satisfy the Socialists by giving them more ministries and influence, however, will undoubtedly draw objections from the two smaller parties.

The Christian Democrats and Socialists remain at odds also on whether to establish a more open consultative relationship between the government and the Communist Party—a development the Socialists feel would limit the Communists' ability to capitalize on their opposition status. The Christian Democrats are opposed and, although the Socialists have been backpedaling on the Communist issue, they have yet to drop the demand altogether. The situation is complicated by the latest Communist statement, in which the party says it wants either to remain in the opposition or to have full membership in the government.

The Communist refusal so far to be drawn into an arrangement like that proposed by the Socialists could help ease the way for a compromise between the latter and the Christian Democrats. On the other hand, the Communist move might reinforce the Socialist tendency to view early parliamentary elections as preferable to being the only major party on the left that has to accept responsibility for government actions.

## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976



### NORWAY

The government has announced a new, more aggressive policy on attacking unidentified submarines in its territorial waters.

The new policy is consistent with the more assertive posture Norway has adopted toward the USSR in recent months. Norway is locked in negotiations with the USSR over delimiting the continental shelf in the Barents Sea, and is stepping up efforts to assert its sovereignty in the Svalbard archipelago against Soviet encroachments.

Demands for new rules developed following an incident in 1972 when contact was made with a suspected submarine in a fjord. The intruder was later lost before it could be positively identified or induced to surface. The search continued for almost two weeks without conclusive results and generated much public interest. There have since been several other intrusions into Norwegian waters.

Pressure for a new policy came from both the right, which thinks such intruders are Soviet, and the left, which claims they are US.

The new rules differentiate among three areas—outer and inner territorial waters and fjords. In the latter, no warning will be given and attack will commence immediately. In outer waters, beyond the base line but within four-mile territorial waters, three warnings will be given. In inner waters, not in a fjord, only one will be given before attack.

A general statement regarding the stricter policy has been published by the government, but detailed rules are classified. Implementation will occur within three months when operational directives are published.



## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

### PORTUGAL-CUBA

Portuguese officials, claiming that "legal" considerations had impeded efforts to block Cuban use of the Azores as a transit stop for flights destined for Africa, say they are now prepared to make a "political" approach to the Cubans on the matter.

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] The Azorean military governor told the press yesterday that the Cuban flights would no longer be allowed to refuel in the Azores.

A Portuguese Foreign Ministry official in Lisbon said yesterday, in reply to the latest in a series of US demarches, that the government is now prepared to act, but that it had felt constrained by the commercial air agreement between Portugal and Cuba. A Foreign Ministry official stated publicly last week that there was no evidence the Cuban planes in question were transporting military personnel or equipment.

[REDACTED]

25X1

A Foreign Ministry official told the US embassy yesterday that Portugal intends to be guided by an African consensus, concerning recognition of the government set up by the Popular Movement. He did not indicate, however, how many African countries would have to recognize the regime before Portuguese recognition would be forthcoming.

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

25X1



### SPANISH SAHARA

Spain's military withdrawal from Spanish Sahara was completed on Monday when the last Spanish troops left Villa Cisneros, the territory's largest commercial center.

According to press reports, both Moroccan and Mauritanian troops were on hand to assume control of Villa Cisneros. Spain had earlier promised to hand over the town to Mauritanian troops, but Rabat may have insisted on sending its own forces, perhaps believing they are needed to secure the town against occupation by guerrilla forces of the Algerian-backed Polisario Front.


25X1



25X1

Morocco's action may also have been influenced by its interest in the town's commercial fishing industry. Nouakchott probably views Villa Cisneros as its fair share of the spoils, in view of Morocco's acquisition of the important phosphate deposits in northern Spanish Sahara, but Rabat may have other ideas. The two countries apparently have not reached full agreement on how Spanish Sahara will be divided.

25X1



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

### USSR-JAPAN

Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Tokyo evidently accomplished no more than either side had anticipated.

Diplomats from the two countries were still haggling over the final communique after Gromyko departed. The result of their long labor was a short document that expressed the usual platitudes about the desirability of expanding economic and cultural relations, confirmed that talks on a peace treaty would continue, and announced that Foreign Minister Miyazawa would go to the USSR in 1976.

One major stumbling point was the Japanese desire to include some reference to the Northern Territories issue. In line with Moscow's current tough line toward Japan, Gromyko would not go beyond the statement included in the Brezhnev-Tanaka communique of 1973, which implied that the territorial issue would be covered as part of the continuing negotiations on a peace treaty. Gromyko raised the possibility of an interim treaty of friendship and cooperation that did not cover the Northern Territories, but he reportedly did not press the point when the Japanese demurred, as they had done last year.

Gromyko was especially harsh on the Japanese for considering a treaty with Peking that would include an anti-hegemony clause. He said publicly that Moscow would have to review its relations with Tokyo if the Japanese went ahead with the treaty. Claiming that Peking seeks hegemony in Asia, he attacked the Chinese for pressing the Japanese to go along with an anti-Soviet policy. The Japanese, for their part, insisted that the anti-hegemony clause is not aimed at the USSR and moved quickly to dispel any idea that Soviet objections would dissuade Tokyo from further normalizing its relations with Peking. Shortly after Gromyko left, Prime Minister Miki said publicly that Japan would continue working to conclude a treaty with Peking, despite Soviet objections.

The Soviet foreign minister made some attempt to put a more positive light on his visit. He was relatively conciliatory on the fisheries problem, saying that Moscow would soon release 32 Japanese fishermen detained in the USSR, and promising increased Soviet efforts to carry out the fisheries agreement that the two sides signed last summer.

Gromyko also went out of his way to call on a variety of influential Japanese—including the Emperor, some of the factional leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and leading industrialists—who would normally not be on his

---


## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

---

schedule. Most Japanese, especially Prime Minister Miki, used their sessions with Gromyko to defend staunchly Japanese interests. With national elections a possibility as early as this spring, Miki and other conservative party leaders, in any case, would have been unlikely to adopt a compromising posture on the long-standing differences between Moscow and Tokyo.

Peking is no doubt delighted at Gromyko's failure to stimulate any progress in Soviet-Japanese relations. Ever since the visit was announced, the Chinese have maintained a steady drumbeat of press comment against Moscow. The Soviets' refusal to return the Northern Territories, they charge, is an example of Soviet "hegemonism," and Gromyko's primary objective in the visit was to throw obstacles in the path of improving Sino-Japanese relations. Peking will highlight Miki's comments on the importance to Tokyo of the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty.





25X6

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1



559102 1-76 CIA

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

### ETHIOPIA

The new year in Ethiopia is beginning much as the old one ended, with violence occurring in nearly all of Ethiopia's 14 provinces.

The secessionist movement in Eritrea Province is still the most serious insurgency facing the ruling military council in Addis Ababa, although the fighting has been stalemated. Fighting could pick up soon, but neither the Eritrean nor the government side has the ability to overcome the other.

Logistic problems, indiscipline, a shortage of trained officers, and low morale have restrained government military operations. A battalion of reinforcements arrived in Eritrea last week, and more troops may soon follow. The reinforcements may signal an increase in government operations against the rebels.

The insurgents, also suffer from poor leadership and from divisions within their ranks. Their leaders apparently do not have a consistent military strategy, nor have they tried to apply theories of modern guerrilla warfare.

The rebels, still divided into two rival factions, seldom coordinate their field operations against government forces. The military commanders of at least one faction are close to breaking with their own political leaders, who live abroad.

Parts of four other northern provinces are outside government control because of rebellions led by landlords opposed to the military regime's land reform program and by prominent figures from the old regime.

A group called the Ethiopian Democratic Union began an insurrection in Bagemder Province in November. The group, which reportedly is also active in Tegre Province, periodically cuts a main road leading to the Sudanese border. The group's two main leaders, who are believed to have widespread support throughout northern Ethiopia, are probably also in contact with local notables who lead minor insurrections in Bagemder, Tegre, Gojam, and Shoa provinces.

The Afar Liberation Front, operating in southern Eritrea and eastern Wollo provinces, occasionally is able to cut the road between Addis Ababa and Assab, where Ethiopia's only oil refinery is located. Most of the clashes between the Afars and government forces are minor, but in December the Afars reportedly executed 18 suspected government sympathizers. Government troops executed 40 Afars in reprisal.

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

Sultan Ali Mirah, the Afar leader, remains in exile in Saudi Arabia, where he fled after fighting between his tribesmen and government forces broke out in June. He is seeking aid from Arab states, so far with little success.

During the past six weeks, insurgents in the Ogaden region, particularly Harar and Bale provinces, have become active. Periodic resistance to central authority is endemic to the Ogaden, which is inhabited by many minority groups, including large numbers of ethnic Somalis. Mogadiscio claims the Ogaden as part of "greater Somalia."

Both ethnic Somalis and Ethiopian Gallas are probably involved in the Ogaden insurgencies. Somalia, however, has apparently aided all of the groups with arms and training in guerrilla warfare.

Ethiopia's ruling military council, in an attempt to deal with the growing violence, has begun enlarging the armed forces. Large numbers of veterans have been recalled and local militia forces are to be created. The new troops, however, will be costly and will place additional burdens on the government's already strained logistic capabilities.

Such new forces will enhance the government's ability to contain for a while longer the various insurgencies, but will not significantly improve the government's military capacity. The military council may be able to hang on in Addis Ababa, but its authority is likely to diminish outside the capital.

25X1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

January 14, 1976

### FOR THE RECORD

MOROCCO-USSR: The Soviet fish factory trawler which had been detained by the Moroccan navy sailed from Agadir on January 10, according to the defense attache in Rabat. Reportedly, the release was ordered after a fine was levied. To save face, the Moroccans now say the trawler Sapfir was stopped off Cape Rhir, some 10 nautical miles northwest of Agadir, for fishing inside the 70-nm economic zone claimed by Morocco. The Soviets claimed the vessel was in international waters testing the trawler net following repairs when it was seized.

25X1


\* \* \* \*

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1

**Top Secret**

**Top Secret**



25X1